About this Video

• Video Title: Why was Russia powerless to prevent Ukraine’s airbase attacks?
• Channel: Binkov's Battlegrounds
• Speakers: The video does not explicitly name the speaker. It is likely Binkov himself.
• Duration: 00:13:53

Introduction

This video analyzes the Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian air bases, explaining why Russia was largely unable to prevent them. The analysis focuses on the limitations of Russian air defenses, the strategic advantages of the drones used, and the logistical challenges faced by Russia in protecting its vast network of airfields.

Key Takeaways

• Russia's vast territory and numerous air bases presented a significant challenge for defensive deployment. The sheer number of potential targets made it impossible to adequately protect each one with sufficient air defenses.
• The Pantsir air defense system, while designed for terminal defense, proved inadequate against small, low-flying drones. Its radar detection range was often too short, and its missiles sometimes failed to detonate due to the drones' low signatures and proximity.
• The Ukrainian attack leveraged the advantages of small, low-flying, and relatively inexpensive drones. These drones could easily evade radar detection, fly at low altitudes to avoid triggering threshold filters, and be launched from close proximity with minimal setup.
• Russia's failure to utilize adequate bomber shelters and its reliance on open-air storage of aircraft contributed to the success of the attacks. The absence of robust protection left the bombers highly vulnerable.
• The intelligence gathering and logistical methods employed by Ukraine played a critical role in the success of the attacks. The use of commercial satellite imagery, indirect routes for smuggling drone components into Russia, and on-site assembly contributed to the operation's secrecy and efficiency.

1. According to Ukraine, 117 small quadcopters were used across four locations. Images of trucks suggest 30 to 60 drones per truck per air base.

2. The Ukrainian drones flew at low altitudes (1-2 meters above ground) and at relatively slow speeds (around 50 kilometers per hour). This allowed them to avoid detection by radars programmed with threshold filters designed to reduce false alarms from things like car traffic or birds. The slow speed also meant that even if detected, there might not have been enough time for a meaningful response.

3. Ukraine used commercial satellite imagery for daily reconnaissance passes to identify targets. They also utilized indirect routes (possibly via Kazakhstan) to smuggle drone parts into Russia, assembling the drones on-site in Russia to avoid detection. Some parts might even have been 3D printed locally.